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Through  the  idea  of  the  sublime,  Kant  articulated  a  type  of  aesthetic  judgement 
whereby one experiences the limits of cognition and representation. The result of this, 
for Kant, is the demonstration and cultivation of our moral nature. Lyotard reframes 
the idea of the sublime in terms of post-modernity through his development of the 
idea of the event. The experience of the event is roughly equivalent to the experience 
of the sublime. Crucially though, the experience of the event, unlike the sublime, does 
not foster individual morality; rather, it points to injustices. 
In the  Critique of Judgement,  Kant refers to  two types  of aesthetic  judgement. 
These are the beautiful and the sublime. For Kant the beautiful is that experience of 
appreciation devoid of concern for function that reveals our ‘supersensible’ capacities 
of cognition.  Here the Kantian emphasis on disinterestedness forces a split between 
the spectator and the artist. In this split the spectator is the passive passenger freed 
from desire, where the experience of art is the analysis of the work. In terms of the 
beautiful, the work of art is merely an occasion to practice one’s critical judgement.
The sublime, however, is a greater experience. It is an experience that hints at that 
which is beyond the powers of our cognition and offers us the chance to develop our 
critical faculties. As such, the sublime refers to the experience of the “presentation of 
the infinite”, or the impossibility of presentation. This experience could be described 
as the experience of the beautiful at the limits of the possibilities of our cognition. In 
the case of the sublime, Kant writes that, it is “...precisely because there is a striving 
in  our  imagination  towards  progress  ad infinitum,  while  reason demands  absolute 
totality, ...[that there] is the awakening of a feeling of a supersensible faculty within 
us...”1), namely the sublime.
Whereas  the  beautiful  typically  occurs  in  the  consideration  of  the  form of  an 
artefact,  the  sublime  is  experience  of  the  limit  of  the  faculty  of  cognition  itself. 
Furthermore, where there is a feeling of pleasure in the beautiful there is a hue of 
terror  in  the  sublime  as  we  face  the  infinite.  Accordingly,  the  experience  of  the 
sublime for Kant is one of frustration as there is an impossibility involved in grasping 
it. Lyotard captures this when he writes; “In the sublime ‘situation,’ something like an 
Absolute...is  made  quasipercieveable,  thanks  to  the  failure  of  the  power  of 
presentation.”2 
Once we are assured that we are not in mortal danger; a certain pleasure can be 
taken from the experience. For Kant, this pleasure is the demonstration of our moral 
nature.  Thus  our  experience  of  the  sublime  is  seen  to  direct  us  to  a  common 
experience of the realisation of our freedom and reason. 
As such, the Kantian sublime has little, if anything, to do with the art world and its 
products, even if it is still central to the operation of the aesthetic and the power of 
judgement.  Instead,  this  concept  is  better  understood  as  fitting  within  the  overall 
critical project of Kant’s philosophy. Nonetheless, the Kantian sublime, as a concept 
that outlines a failure of the imagination to represent and frame understanding, albeit 
at  the  service  of  a  greater  moral  and  epistemological  project,  is  useful  to 
contemporary  aesthetic  practice  and  theory.  In  pointing  to  aesthetic  experience 
beyond  the  merely  functionally  beautiful,  the  sublime  provides  the  basis  for  a 
particularly presently prevalent approach to art, namely the “evental”.3
II. THE EVENT
While Lyotard accurately describes the sublime in Kant, he then goes on to propose a 
particular interpretation of the Kantian sublime. For Kant the sublime is subject to a 
teleological end insofar as it ought to lead to a realisation of the moral law. This is not 
the case in Lyotard’s writings.  For Lyotard the sublime needs to be understood in 
terms of the postmodern condition. 
1 Kant (2007), p. 81, §25.
2 Lyotard (1990), p. 298.
3  Lyotard (1990), p. 98.
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This  postmodern  condition  is  a  feature  of  the  failed  attempt  to  create  grand, 
rationalised  narratives.  It  is  a  disillusionment  with the  project  of  modernity  itself. 
Postmodernism  is  the  coming  to  terms  with  the  singularity  (and  thus 
unrepresentability)  of  events.  The  enlightenment  project  of  modernity  is  built  on 
Kantian  foundations  and  Lyotard  returns  to  the  Kantian  account  of  judgement  to 
understand the postmodern. He focuses on the area of the sublime. Lyotard reframes 
the  sublime  as  an  example  of  an  indeterminate  and  irreconcilable  event.  Post-
modernity  here  is  the  rethinking  of  the  event  that  is  modernity.  The  sublime  in 
Lyotard is akin to the Kantian sublime in terms of being the limit of the capacity of 
human reason, but it is different in the sense of omitting the teleological goal of the 
realisation of the moral law.
For  Lyotard,  opposition  to  the  aspirations  of  modernity  is  what  marks  the 
dissolution of grand narratives  in the postmodern age.  The grand narrative that is 
modernism is characterised by the historical progression of freedom and rationality of 
the human subject. The Kantian sublime is a case of such high goals of a unifying 
theory of judgement, rationality and morality,  while at the same time it marks that 
moment of crisis, that moment of terrible awe. “The aesthetics of the sublime is still 
more indeterminate: a pleasure mixed with pain, a pleasure that comes from pain.”4 
For Lyotard, no moral instruction is to be found in the sublime. Lyotard rejects not 
the  sublime  per  se,  but  the  accompanying  moral  project.  Rather  the  sublime 
experience, as the edge of human reason, is “an event of a passion, of a suffering for 
which the mind won’t be prepared, which will have left it at a loss, and for which it 
retains  only  the  feeling  -  anxiety  and  jubilation  -  of  an  obscure  thought.”5 The 
difference between this approach and Kant’s is clear; the sublime is no longer seen to 
provide moral instruction but is also historically situated and as such can speak to the 
contemporary institutional configuration of the art world. 
As such, Lyotard is an evental thinker. The event refers to a historical occurrence 
which  changes  all  that  follows  it;  the  standard  examples  include  the  French 
Revolution and the death camps of Auschwitz. In the words of Lyotard: “...there are 
events:  something  happens  which  is  not  tautological  with  what  has  happened”6. 
44 Lyotard (1991), p. 98.
55 Lyotard (1990), p. 302.
66 Lyotard (1988), p. 79.
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Specifically,  Lyotard  “...strives  to  respect  the  event  in  its  singularity...”7 To  even 
speak of events in representational terms as we are bound to do is to betray their 
singularity.  That is the unique historical context to which they are bound. Like the 
sublime  in  Kant,  the  event  exists  at  the  threshold  of  representation  and  operates 
according to its own logic. As such, it can never be fully rendered by representation. 
In this way the event is akin to ‘the supplement’ in Derrida and ‘that which is not 
counted’ in Ranciѐre. To speak of the event is to speak of occurrences in a particular 
way, a way that admits unrepresentability. In Lyotard’s case it is used to show that 
occurrences cannot be easily represented as they are singular,  unrepresentable  and 
inhabitants  of  the  figural  as  opposed  to  the  discursive.  The  impossibility  of 
representation is developed in The Differend; Phrases in Dispute (1988 [1983]). For 
Lyotard this impossibility extends to all forms of representation: aesthetic, political 
etc.  The differend is an example of incommensurability beyond the possibilities of 
representation. A case is referred to as an example of the differend when two or more 
sides use different languages that cannot be translated into each other without doing 
injustice to at least one of the sides. In such cases the operational representational 
regime cannot account for the differences because the singularity of each case (event) 
is lost in translation.
The  task  of  aesthetics  is  to  realise  the  incommensurable  beyond  what  can  be 
represented, and, to testify to that which cannot be represented. In a sense the task of 
the aesthetics of the sublime remains a task of justice in the aesthetics of the event. 
Schiller, following Kant, had used the idea of the experience of the sublime as a 
foundation for moral education. For Schiller, it is through aesthetic experience that 
social justice will be achieved. His reasoning is that in experiencing the sublime one 
is made freer and thus will act more morally. Schiller can be seen, thus, to affirm the 
Kantian project in his application of the idea of moral education through aesthetic 
experience to modernity. In short, the sublime is a means to social justice insofar as it 
makes man more moral. The event, on the other hand, is not heuristic in this sense. 
The event, as we have seen, is a means to social justice insofar as it highlights the 
existence of gross inequalities and injustice. Implied here is the thought that armed 
with such knowledge we will be better able to tackle injustice. 
77 Bennington (1988), p. 9.
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There is a further affinity with the Kantian reflection on the sublime here in the 
opposition  to  the  production  of  concepts.  Lyotard,  like  Schiller,  is  not  simply 
critiquing the Kantian project but explicitly moving it (or at least the element of the 
sublime in Kant) into the realm of the political. For Lyotard, to operate in terms of the 
event is not to account for the context of aesthetic experience, but to recognise the 
singularity of the event of experience itself. Each reading is an event. It is a reflection 
where  the  judgment  always  occurs  anew.  Forcing  a  final  concept  on  the 
reading/reflection  is  akin  to  the  grossest  injustice,  not  only  because  it  denies  the 
experience of the sublime, but because it denies the singularity of experience itself.
Bill Readings outlines the politics of Lyotard’s approach to the aesthetic in this 
way: “The aesthetic of incommensurability is the attempt to set to work, within and 
against the system, an otherness that cannot be exchanged. Obviously, this otherness 
cannot  itself  be the  object  of  a  representation,  lest  it  become another  commodity 
rather than an other to the rule of the commodity.”8 Politics and aesthetics are thus 
conjoined,  insofar  as  each  is  a  site  of  contested  representation.  Taking  Lyotard’s 
approach (the event informed by the sublime) we can see that the accepted operative 
distinctions  of  the  art  world  (genres,  styles,  modes  of  presentation)  are  to  be 
considered as limiting meta-narratives barring the aesthetic experience of the sublime. 
Furthermore, in  the politics of the contemporary art world the reception of new art 
practices as art will demonstrate a negotiation of the sublime. 
By focusing on the institutional  reception  of  new art  practices,  specifically  the 
acceptance of graffiti as street art, we will be able to see how Lyotard’s idea of the 
event applies to contemporary art practice. For it is in such institutional re-evaluation 
that alternative art practices are conceptualised. 
III. THE INSTITUTIONAL THEORY OF ART
Initially defined by Arthur Danto, the concept of the “art world” is characterized in 
this  way:  “to  see  something  as  art  requires  something  the  eye  cannot  descry  an 
atmosphere of artistic theory, a knowledge of the history of art: an artworld”9. The 
institutional theory of art can be seen as an attempt to approach aesthetics in terms of 
social and historical frames of reference. “What makes the piece art?”10 asks Danto, 
88 Readings (2009), p. xx.
99 Danto (1964), p. 580.
1010 Ibid.
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and the answer, crudely put, is that the piece is in the gallery and not the stockroom. 
In other words, something is art by virtue of its location in the artworld.
This  reductivist  account  strives  for  the  ideal,  untranscendable,  configuration  of 
social and institutional structures. Bound up with this is the idea of the autonomy of 
the artwork and the artist. Here exhibition within an institutional frame, as opposed to 
a particular experience, is seen as the essence of art. In practice, this approach can be 
witnessed in the proliferation of the white cube as a neutral space for exhibiting.  In 
the words of Bydler; “the institutional frames are fields where subject-positions are 
mapped out”11.  To put this  practice in Kantian terms, we see that the roles of the 
curator and the artist are to search for instances of the sublime and then showcase 
them  in  the  artworld  setting.  Such  tasks  are  impossible.  Where  the  institutional 
approach  benefits  in  clarity  it  fails  to  account  for  the  singularity  of  aesthetic 
experience central  to the sublime.  There is  no perfect/ideal  art  world but rather  a 
contested  space/territory.  The  artwork  is  not  immune  from  its  context  as  the 
institutional  theorists  should well  know; there  is  a  politics  of exhibition.  Thus,  to 
speak of the institution you need to account for this politics of change in relation to 
the traditional economy of the art world.
One way to do this is to treat of the practices that reform and expand the notion of 
what counts as an art gallery or art world. In using the example of graffiti as art I will 
maintain the incommensurable as central to the account of the art world. Significantly, 
we will see that, over time, the disruptive logic of the consideration of graffiti as art is 
incorporated into institutional practice undermining its force as something that could 
potentially provide aesthetic experiences similar to the sublime or the event. 
IV. GRAFFITI AS ART
In proposing something traditionally called vandalism as art, the idea of graffiti  as 
street art is a consideration that suggests something beyond our normal cognition of 
what art, at least in its institutional configuration, is. This idea is one that approaches 
the infinite insofar as it radically expands the location of art to every street. In this 
sense, graffiti art can be seen to stand for something like political dissent, insofar as it 
challenges the operative distinctions of the traditional art world. 
1111 Bydler (2004), p. 21.
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For example, unlike the traditional gallery, the street as gallery is without a central 
curator.  The  significance  of  this  is  that  the  traditional  limitations  of  what  can  be 
represented within an artworld setting, for example painting, sculpture etc. need not 
apply.  Instead,  art  on  the  street  is  chosen  solely  by  graffiti  artists.  In  fact,  this 
approach to exhibition proposes a model of “collective curation”. By this term, I refer 
to both the fact of installation that accompanies the creation of street art, namely the 
curatorial decision made by the street artists about the location and timing of their art, 
and the collaborative nature of this decision. While street artists can ostensibly work 
as  individuals,  as  well  as  being  part  of  an  explicit  collective,  they  nonetheless 
collaborate with the physical setting of their work. This curatorial feature of street art 
ensures that the typical agency of the art world and clarity of institutional theory is 
disrupted. 
This  is  achieved  by  the  necessary  engagement  with  the  built  and  natural 
environment, the public, institutions, the work of other street artists’ etc.  for the piece 
of street art to work. The greater significance of this situated approach is that the ideal 
of  the  individuated  genius,  the  romantic  myth  of  the  aesthetic  experience  as  an 
individual’s experience in both production and consumption, inherited from Kant, is 
overcome.  In such collaborative art, Kester notes: “The participant’s engagement is 
actualized by immersion and participation in a process, rather  than through visual 
contemplation (reading or decoding an image or object).”12 
Crucially, in this nature of the work, is the core of what Lyotard called the event. 
And, in being evental, graffiti art retains a residue of the sublime. This is not to say 
that political otherness of graffiti exactly corresponds to the definition of the event 
that we see in Lyotard or the definition of the sublime that we see in Kant. Rather, it is 
to  say  that  for  the  purposes  of  considering  contemporary  aesthetic  practice,  the 
ambiguous  nature  of  the  exhibition  of  graffiti  challenges  what  we take  to  be  the 
traditional exhibition of art. In this the consideration of graffiti as art can be seen to 
maintain a vital  link to both the event and the sublime. That link is the ability of 
graffiti,  and  other  such  practices,  to  do  justice  to  a  greater  scope  of  aesthetic 
experience than permitted by the traditional institutional structure.
As a site of ambiguity the collective exhibiting of graffiti  disrupts the classical 
account of the art gallery in the way that an avant-garde would seek to do. It does this 
1212 Kester (2006), p. 10.
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by showing us, both the degree to which the artworld can incorporate change, and, by 
demonstrating  the  nature  of  aesthetic  and  embodied  engagement  permitted  in  the 
contemporary conception of art. In this way graffiti art, in its current instantiation, is 
both subject to the classical distinctions of the artworld (insofar as it is considered 
vandalism) and event of political dissent (insofar as it is a new form for art, street art). 
Graffiti  is both an event insofar as it is a significant departure from the traditional 
operation of the artworld, yet it is also institutional insofar as it proposes a new, more 
sophisticated, institutional model. In short, graffiti is an avant-garde.
As far back as Clement Greenberg’s essay “Avant-Garde and Kitsch” the notion of 
the avant-garde has been identified in relation to the economic and political conditions 
of the time. For Greenberg, it is this social and historical import that distinguishes the 
avant-garde from say bohemia. While creativity and originality are central to both, the 
avant-garde is in some way a focused social critique. As such, the theory of the avant-
garde compliments the institutional theory of art. 
Herein lies the dilemma for graffiti and street art: in succumbing to the institutional 
recognition  it  appears  to  forego  the  avant-garde  aspiration  of  social  critique  and 
change, and, in so doing, any claims to being evental or sublime are abdicated. The 
reason being that by this account the avant-garde institution is impossible. Yet, like all 
avant-gardes we find graffiti being subsumed into the artworld. Graffiti begins with 
the artist categorised as anonymous and autonomous. In fact this carries to the degree 
that street art is often regarded as a product of a group, be it the city, the youth, the 
disaffected.  Thus,  when we become able  to  name graffiti  artists  the work is  in  a 
different economy. That economy is the traditional economy of the artworld. Here too 
the graffiti artist begins to trade his/her work. The success in graffiti achieving such 
status is witnessed in the utter assimilation of graffiti in contemporary culture as a 
legitimate aesthetic practice.  The popularity of figures such as Shepard Fairey and 
Banksy demonstrate that graffiti  art, as a practice, is no longer beyond our normal 
cognition of what an aesthetic experience can be.
Furthermore, this change is marked by a change of name: the term graffiti is now 
replaced by the term street art. The acts of mimicking the economy of the artworld 
render  the  economy  of  the  street  art  world  but  a  functioning  arm of  the  greater 
capitalist economy. The initial critique, if it has not now become impossible, has at 
the very least to be reconsidered. By this account the economy of street art is just the 
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latest in a series of inclusions into the economy of the artworld. The promise of a new 
distinct artworld economy has disappeared. 
If  we analyse  the  name “street  art”  we find that  the two names  are  joined for 
mutual benefit. “Art” is used for and as a result of institutional validation. “Street” is 
used for validation within the graffiti  and avant-garde communities. These benefits 
ensure the exclusion of other possible names; one could be “career graffiti”.
In the context of a gallery, graffiti present us with the spectacle of rubbish in the 
form of  art.  Once  this  re-evaluation  occurs  graffiti  redefine  the  urban space  as  a 
potential institutional space. The relationship between the art institution and trash is a 
curious one. The 20th century showcased trash to the extent that the landfill became a 
staple  venue  of  the  artist’s  experience.  What  is  noticeable  is  that  objects  are  not 
exhibited  as  garbage  for  such is  impossible.  To be  deemed  worthy enough to  be 
exhibited is to be barred from being deemed trash. At first it would appear that to be 
exhibited within the institutional frame is to be automatically beyond the realm of 
valueless  trash.  However,  it  is  also  possible  that  once  veritable  trash  is  exhibited 
within the institutional frame the distinction between art and trash loses some of its 
currency if it has not been completely superseded. 
The equating of art to trash can also be read as the trashing of art. One step further, 
it can be read as a critique of the distinctions of art and rubbish. This new critiquing of 
art activity then comes to stand for art. As Sylvѐre Lotringer notes “[C]riticising art, 
in fact, has become the royal way to an art career...”13 It is here that the introspection 
of  the  artworld  is  made  clear.  This  re-evaluation  is  but  criticism  of  the  initial 
evaluation. It is not a different evaluation. 
And, it is this commercial realisation on the part of art institutions that is a key 
driving force behind re-evaluation. The alternative means of distribution used in the 
graffiti artworld appeals to the artworld in the same way that new markets appeal to 
corporations. In short, new distribution channels mean new products can be sold (as 
art).  The trash gallery thus operates as an outsourced tier  of a greater institutional 
network. Significantly,  the alternative gallery,  as seen in the collective curation of 
graffiti, maintains the scope for building reputations. As such, the economic basis for 
the artist, the bedrock of the global artworld economy, is never undermined. 
1313 Baudrillard (2005), p. 10.
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V. CONCLUSION
The  institutionalization  of  graffiti  as  gallery  art,  as  objects  to  be  considered  like 
paintings, sees graffiti limited to what Kant would call the beautiful. The effect of the 
institutional showcasing of graffiti as art is to deny the inherent ambiguity central to 
the collective installation of graffiti. The cost of institutional clarity is the possibility 
of  aesthetic  experiences  approaching  the  sublime  or  the  event.  Today  graffiti  is 
wedged between being purely radically  evental  unrepresentability  and institutional 
representation and commercial co-option. 
These contemporary developments in art practice reinforce an account of art that is 
still  institutional. Subversion now cannot be separated from institutional subversion. 
Graffiti  has  been  effective  in  this  insofar  as  it  effectively  challenged  what  an 
exhibition can be, in other words it  helps to expand the notion of the beautiful  to 
include trash. As such it  operates like an exemplary avant-garde whereby it offers 
both  change  to  the  artworld  and  increases  the  power  of  the  artworld.  It  is  the 
traditional embodiment of anti-tradition. 
The sublime, the state of awe, the psychological consideration of incompleteness 
and obscurity is originally a literary concept (in Longinus for example) as well as an 
ethical  concept.  Only later  does the sublime become a religious  or  transcendental 
concept linked to political emancipation. In the idea of the event the sublime returns 
to  this  literary  origin  accompanied  by  the  goal  of  political  emancipation.  It  is  a 
concept devoid of rule or law insofar as there is no sure way to access the experience 
of the sublime. 
The significance of graffiti achieving art status is that this experience demonstrates 
how  and  at  what  cost  such  ambiguity  and  obscurity  is  incorporated  into  the 
institutional framework and how art world theory and the sublime interact. Graffiti, 
thus, while achieving institutional status and the expansion of the aesthetic franchise, 
loses much of its force as a location for the experience of the sublime or the event. To 
put  this  in  the  language  of  both  Kant  and Lyotard,  once  graffiti  is  institutionally 
recognised, showcased and championed, it is firmly conceptualised. When this occurs 
it loses much of its ability to stand at the limits of our cognition and what we can 
represent.  
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